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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah

Code

Annotated,

3 5-1-67

Section

(1975)

is

the

determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the
Addendum hereto as Exhibit A.

SUMMARY OF REPLY
As a result of an industrial injury, Mr. Zupon is no longer
able to be employed in any well-known branch of the labor market.
Although he undeniably has other medical problems, it was his
industrial injury which rendered him unable to work.

Due to his

advanced age, limited education and other health problems, he is
not a suitable candidate for vocational rehabilitation and is a
classic "odd-lot" doctrine case. Since this case arises under pre1988

law,

the

"odd-lot"

doctrine

applies

and

Kaiser

Steel

Corporation had the burden of finding a line of employment which he
could perform. The employer in this case has wholly failed to meet
that burden.
The

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

of

the

Administrative Law Judge are deficient in that they are not
detailed

enough to meet legal requirements.

The Industrial

Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review, which is the Order on
appeal, is even more deficient in failing to engage in proper fact
finding.
This

Court

should

summarily

reverse

the

Industrial

Commission's final agency action, by ruling that Mr. Zupon was
entitled to the presumption afforded by the "odd-lot" doctrine, as
1

it was not rebutted, as a matter of law in this case. Failing sue]
a

ruling, this matter

should

be remanded

to the Industrial

Commission for more detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions oJ
Law,

ARGUMENT
I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE "ODD LOT"
DOCTRINE TO PETITIONERS PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY
CLAIM, AND SUCH APPLICATION RESULTS IN A PRESUMPTION OF
ENTITLEMENT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REBUTTED.
A.

APPLICATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

Respondents have completely misconstrued Petitioner's argument
in regard to the applicable burden of proof.

Petitioner does not

dispute that he has the burden of demonstrating medical and legal
causation

by a preponderance of the evidence.

Petitioner's

argument on this point, however, is that the Workers' Compensation
Act is to be "liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and
any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of
the claim."

See, e.g., McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d

153, 155 (Utah 1977).
Petitioner raises this point not as a "substitute for his
burden of proof" as Respondents argue, but rather to show that the
Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review did not
evidence the "humane and beneficent purposes" required by the law.
Petitioner accepts his burden of proof to demonstrate medical and
legal causation; he only argues that in meeting that burden, such
2

doubt as does exist in the record is to be resolved in his favor.
Respondents

do

not deny

this well

established

principal of

construction of workers' compensation law.
The second basis of Petitioner's argument is that under the
so-called

"odd-lot" doctrine, once Petitioner had proved his

disability and inability to be rehabilitated, the burden then
shifted to the employer to find regular, steady work which he could
perform. In order to fully appreciate the application of the "oddlot" doctrine it is helpful to understand it's development and the
factual context to which it has been applied.
B.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE.

Perhaps the first case to discuss the concept of the "odd-lot"
doctrine was the English case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 1 KB
1009 (1911):
There are cases in which the burden of shewing suitable
work can in fact be obtained does fall up the employer.
... [If]... the capacities for work left to him fit him
only for special uses and do not ... make his powers of
labour a merchantable article in some well known lines of
the labor market....[I]t is incumbent upon the employer
to shew that such special employment can in fact be
obtained by him.... flf 1 the accident leaves the workman's
labour in the position of an "odd-lot" in the labor
market, the employer must shew that a customer can be
found who will take it .... (Emphasis added).
Judge

Cordozo

very

early

in

the

history

of

workmen's

compensation in the United States, set the policy for odd-lot
determination:
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his
request for employment with notice that labor must be
light. The applicant imposing such conditions is quickly
put aside for more versatile competitors. Business has
little patience with the suitor for ease and favor. He
is the 'odd-lot' man, the nondescript in the labor
3

market. Work, if he gets it. is likely to be casual and
intermittent...Rebuff. if suffered, might reasonably be
ascribed to the narrow opportunities that await the sick
and halt. Jordan v. Decorative Co.. 130 N.E. 635, 636
(N.Y. App. 1921). (Emphasis added).
Professor Larson in his oft cited treatise on workmen's
compensation law describes this doctrine, as follows:
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in
virtually every jurisdiction, total disability may be
found in the case of workers who, while not altogether
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the
labor market. The essence of the test is the probable
dependability with which claimant can sell his services
in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such
factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular
employer or fiends, temporary good luck, or the
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his
crippling handicaps. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation. § 57.51 at 10-164.24 (1992). (Footnotes
omitted). (Emphasis added).
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN UTAH.
The "odd-lot" doctrine has been accepted and favorably applied
by the Utah Courts.

One of the first modern Utah cases applying

the doctrine was Brundage v. IML Freight. Inc.. 622 P.2d 790 (Utah
1980) where the injured worker had spent thirty years as a truck
driver. In August of 1975, he injured his back in a non-industrial
accident which led to surgery later that year.

In October, 1976,

he had recovered sufficiently to return to his job as a truck
driver. He subsequently reinjured his back in the course and scope
of his employment and in 1977 again underwent surgery on his back.
Several months later, however, he re-injured his back in another
non-industrial accident and was thereafter unable to return to
work.
The Industrial Commission found Mr. Brundage suffered from a
4

30% permanent partial impairment, half of which was attributable to
the industrial injury, and half of which was attributable to
nonindustrial causes. Mr. Brundage was awarded permanent partial
impairment benefits, but his claim for permanent total disability
was denied.
In reversing the Industrial Commission's ruling regarding
permanent total disability, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In his treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
Professor Arthur Larson states:
'total disability' in compensation law is not
to be interpreted literally as utter and
abject helplessness.... The task is to phrase
a rule delimiting the amount and character of
work a [person] can be able to do without
forfeiting his totally disabled status.
2
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation. §
57.51 at 10-107 (1992).
Consonant with the view expressed by Larson, the
Supreme Court has adopted the following definition of
total disability:
This Court has recognized the principle that a
workman may be found totally disabled if by
reason of the disability resulting from his
injury he cannot perform work of the general
character he was performing when injured, or
any other work which a fperson] of his
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to
do. . . .
United Park City Mines Co. v.
Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 (1964).
(Emphasis added).
The next important decision was Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d
495 (Utah 1981). Mr. Wilkins, who was 55 years old at the time of
his

industrial

injury,

sold

trailers

and

other

types

of

recreational vehicles which required him to travel throughout the
west contacting dealers. In 1977, he suffered an industrial injury
to his back while on a business trip when he slipped and struck his
5

back on some large rocks while attempting to unhitch a trailer. He
was off work for some time while undergoing physical therapy, and
although he later return to light duty, he was eventually unable tc
continue because of pain. In defining the term "total disability,"
the Court stated as follows:
...'total disability' does not mean a state of abject
helplessness or that the injured employee must be unable
to do any work at all. The fact that an injured employee
may be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional
wages does not necessarily preclude a finding of total
disability to perform the work or follow the occupation
in which he was injured. His temporary disability may be
found to be total if he can no longer perform the duties
of the character required in his occupation prior to his
(Emphasis
injury. Id at 498.
(Citations omitted).
added).
The "odd-lot" doctrine was next considered in the monumental
case of Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah
1984) .

The Applicant was employed by Emery Mining Company as a

maintenance mechanic in a coal mine. While leaving the mine in the
back of a tractor-trailer, he was bounced up and down on the seat
causing

an

injury

to

his

back.

After

several

months

of

conservative medical treatment, Mr. Marshall underwent surgery.
Following surgery he was advised by his doctor that he could not
return to work.

Mr. Marshall was 67 years of age at the time.

The Industrial Commission awarded Mr. Marshall permanent
partial impairment compensation finding he sustained a 10% whole
body permanent, partial impairment due to the industrial accident
and 15% due to pre-existing conditions.

However, the Commission

refused his request for permanent total disability stating the
primary reason he was unable to return to work was his age.
6

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission
ruling that Mr. Marshall was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine.
The Court defined permanent total disability as follows:
TA1 workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of
the disability resulting from his injury he cannot
perform work of the general character he was performing
when injured, or any other work which a man of his
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to do. . . . 681
P.2d at 211. (Emphasis added).
The Court further stated:
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, but in terms
of the specific individual who has suffered a workrelated injury. An injury to a hand would not cause the
same degree of disability in a teacher, for example, as
it would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing the loss
of earning capacity, a constellation of factors must be
considered, only one of which is the physical impairment.
Other factors are age, education, training and mental
capacity.
It is the unique configuration of these
factors that together will determine the impact of the
impairment on the individual's earning capacity. JDd. at
211. (citations omitted).
Some employees, however, cannot be rehabilitated and
even though not in a state of abject helplessness ' can
no longer perform the duties . . . required in [their]
occupation[s].' These employees fall into the so-called
'odd-lot' category... Whether or not an employee falls
into the odd-lot category depends on whether there is
regular, dependable work available for the employee who
does not rely on the sympathy of friends or his own super
human efforts. Once the employee has presented evidence
that he can no longer perform the duties reguired in his
occupation and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence of
regular, steady work that the employee can perform,
taking into account the employee's education, mental
capacity and age. ... 'It is much easier for the
[employer] to prove the employability of the [employee]
for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to
prove the universal negative of not being employable at
any work.' Id at 212-213. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis
added).
Finally, the Court pointed out that the majority of odd-lot
7

cases are concerned with employees whose work involved physical
labor, were 50 years of age and older, and had moderate or littl*
education, similar to the Petitioner herein.

Id. at 212.

In Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 132:
(Utah 1986) , the Plaintiff, who was sixty years old with a limitec
education

and even more limited work background,

suffered c

fractured skull when a steel beam fell and stuck him on the head.
A Medical Panel found that he had a 25% whole body permanent,
partial impairment, with 15% being related to the industrial injur}
and 10% being related to pre-existing conditions.

He requested

permanent, total disability benefits based on his overall physical
impairment, as well as his age and lack of education and skills.
Despite

the

request, the

Industrial

Commission

awarded

onli

permanent, partial impairment compensation.
In finding that the Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case
of permanent, total disability, the Court stated:
The Commission's findings failed to acknowledge the oddlot doctrine accepted in most jurisdictions and which has
been repeatedly approved by this Court. That doctrine
recognized the substantial difference between physical
impairment and disability. For example, a low percentage
of physical impairment is not per se less than total
permanent disability. Numerous other courts applying the
odd-lot doctrine have found permanent total disability
despite a deceptively low percentage of physical
impairment.... The odd lot doctrine further requires an
evaluation of disability in terms of the specific
individual who has suffered work-related injury....
Absent proof of employment reasonably available to one in
the odd-lot category, the injured employee should be
classified as totally disabled. Id. at 1326-1327.
(Citations omitted). (Emphasis added).
In Norton v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986),
decided

shortly

after

the

Hardman
8

case,

the

Supreme

Court

reiterated it's holding in Hardman as follows:
As in Hardman,.•. the Commission again failed in this
case to carry out its tasks.
It adopted with slight
modification the findings of impairment reported by the
medical panel but then failed in its administrative
responsibility
and
function
to
evaluate
Norton's
permanent disability which should have included such
factors as Norton's 'present and future ability to engage
in gainful activity' as it is affected by such diverse
factors as age, sex, education, economic and social
environment, in addition to the definite medical factorpermanent impairment. Id. at 1027.

Upon remand the Commission is required to address
Norton's disability in light of all factors mentioned
ante, and the burden will be on the employer to prove the
existence of regular, steady work that Norton could
perform, taking into account his age, limited education
and functional illiteracy as well as his disabling pain.
Id. at 1028.
(Emphasis added).
J

In Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co, ,

31

1987), the injured worker was employed as an industrial maintenance
mechanic for the defendant.

He suffered *

> industrial

injuries

which together resulted in a permanent pari . •; impairment of 1 2% on
a whole body basis

Following surgery, he returned to work with

light duty restrictions.

He retired approximately one year latter

at age 65 and at that time requested that he be awarded permanent,
total disability
Judge

approved

compensation.
permanent

Although the Administrative

total

compensation,

the

Law

Industrial

Commission reversed.
The Utah Supreme Court overruled the Industrial Commission's
df»c i s ion

11111J r cj> 1 nst at ed

t tip Aiiin j 1111 st 1 at i vrj

Law

Jutihff ,. r u 1 1 nq

citing approvingly the Norton, Marshall and Hardman decisions.
Finally,

in

the

recent

case

9

of

Zimmermann

v.

Industrial

Commission, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989), the Court stated:
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 'odd lot doctrine'
which allows the Commission to find permanent total
disability when a relatively small percentage of
impairment caused by an industrial accident is combined
with other factors to render the claimant unable to
obtain employment. Id. at 1131. (citations omitted).
* * *

Hardman sets forth the following steps for qualification
under the 'odd-lot' doctrine;
(1) the employee must
prove that he or she can no longer perform the duties
required in his or her occupation; (2) the employee,
having been referred to the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commission, must,
through cooperation with the Division, establish that he
or she cannot be rehabilitated; and (3) the burden then
shifts to the employee to prove the existence of steady
work the employee can perform, taking into account
several factors, including the employee's education,
mental capacity, and age. Id. at 1131. (Citations
omitted). (Emphasis added).
D.

APPLICATION OF FACTS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE 0DD-L01

DOCTRINE.
As initially stated in Hardman and clarified in Zimmermann
there are three steps required for the application of the odd-lot
doctrine: (1) the employee must prove that he can no longer perforin
the duties required in his or her occupation; (2) the employee must
prove that he cannot be rehabilitated; and (3) the employer then
has the burden to prove the existence of regular, steady work the
employee can perform.

If the employer can not do so, the injured

worker is entitled to permanent, total disability compensation as
an "odd-lot11 injured worker.
A review of each of those elements discloses that the first
two are satisfied in this case, but the Employer failed in its
burden to find a job that Mr. Zupon could do or learn to do.
10

1.

Inability to perform the duties required

in his

occupation.
Both t h e Administrative L a w Judge and t h e Industrial
Commission spend a ] ot of time attempting t o prove that I t w a s M r ,
Zupon's other

medicd 1 cond i t ions wh n In pr evented h :i s return to

work; however, for t h e purpose of the "odd-lot" doctrine medical
causation is irrelevant.

T h e only relevant issue at this stage is

whether M r . Zupon could continues t o perform t h e type of work; that
he w a s performing prior to being injured,
r a 11 ona .1

of

11 i e

soc i a 1

S e c\ i ^ i ty

For this reason, the

Adm i n i s t r a t ion

is tot a 1 ly

irrelevant to t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n or t h e applicability of t h e "oddlot" d o c t r i n e . N o n e of tt\* p a r t i e s seriously argue that M r . Zupon
can r • -1

• •••

^h

-»

the Administrative Law Judge's decision Mr. Zupon was a
man who had not worked since 1975,
. '.

Ii: :i .ulilit ion

fiinil most

rea>

Did

(R. at 22, 2 9 ) .
siqnjf iranl ly

Mi

uiipon dull in

fact attempt to return to work after his industrial injury, and was
denied other jobs because he could not pass the required physicals
due

to

his

back

uncontroverted.

problems.

(R.

at

29) .

That

testimony

was

The Administrative Law Judge found that he had not

worked since iy/o, ior a total of almost. ± / years.

( K . at. 2-

The

Medical Panel appointed by the Industrial Commission specifically
agreed with Mr. Zupon's treating physician " ,
c n:

-

inability to work.

*•.»*-.,

.;,-». •' ami

(R.

that the claimant

further

referenced

his

Respondents did not present any

evidence that following his industrial injury Mr. Zupon was capable

1±

of performing the duties required in his occupation.
He was paid temporary, total disability compensation until
February 1976, when he began receiving disability pension benefits
from

his

union.

Subsequently,

he

received

Social

Securit]

disability benefits and a Veteran's disability pension. (R. at 29)
And finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Norton, supra, helc
significantly as follows:
Provided that worker's disability was also analyzed with
the framework of the odd-lot doctrine, case law dealing
with the factor of substantial pain has general held that
'[a] worker who cannot return to any gainful employment
without suffering substantial pain is entitled to
compensation benefits for total disability.' (Citations
omitted). Id. at 1028.
2.

INABILITY TO BE REHABILITATED.

Due to the Industrial Commission's finding that Mr. Zupon hac
failed to establish the necessary causation between his impairment
and his industrial accident, a rehabilitation evaluation was not
ordered by the Industrial Commission. Nevertheless it is difficult
to argue that in light of his health, age and limited educatior
that Mr. Zupon could be vocationally rehabilitated.
There is no evidence in this case that the Employer die
anything to enhance Mr. Zupon7s employment possibilities, and ir
fact, the uncontroverted evidence is to the effect that it simply
declined to permit him to return to work as a coal miner, and took
no further actions whatsoever to assist him in locating suitable
employment.
The evidence is clear and overwhelming that following his
industrial

injury

Mr.

Zupon

could
12

not

be

rehabilitated

for

meaningful an**. sustained employment, and the Employer failed to
assist him in .5; . way1 111 mloiiKj so.
EXISTENCE

OF

REGULAR,

STEADY

WORK

THE

EMPLOYEE

CAN

ana

\2)

prove

the

PERFORM.
Once the injured worker has satisfied ejemeritis ('(
above,

the

burden

then

shifts

to

the

Employer

to

existence nf leqular steady work the employee can perform, taking
into account several factors, including the employee's education,
mental capacity, and age,

Hardman, at

132 7.

The

Respondent

Emp] oyer I: las 1 lot made ev ei: 1 a pretence of maki ng si ich a showi 1 ig i n
this case. This failure undoubtedly resulted from the fact that in
this case such a burden simply could n*.* re net . Given M r . Zupon's
advanced a g e , sever e hea] tl: 1 pi: ol .-•:.--•;

• • *c:i edi icati 01 1, there

is simply no steady work he can now perform, or that he could be
retrained

to

learn

to

do,

aw

uic

Employer

does

not

argue

otherwise.
Therefore,
permanent

Mr.

£upon

has

established

his

entitlement

tot. a I d i s a b i 1 :i t/y as an "odd lot" injured worker.

to
The

presumption inherent i n that doctrine has not been rebutted as a
m a t t e r of law, and an appropriate award of benefits should be
issued.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO PROPERLY REVIEW THIS
MATTER AND ITS ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW IS LEGALLY
DEFICIENT AND MUST BE REVERSED.
T h e Industrial Commission w a s required to consider the Motion
for Review in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
13

63-46b-12(6)(c) (1988), which provides as follows:
The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule
permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the
issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the
issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion of
the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further
administrative reconsideration or judicial
review available* to aggrieved parities; and
(viii)
the time limits applicable to any
appeal or review.
A review of the Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motior
for Review, a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum as
Exhibit B, reveals that it is wholly deficient in this regard and
does not meet recent legal requirements. No specific Findings are
made.

Rather, the Industrial Commission merely summarized, with

editorial comments, the evidence presented and the Administrative
Law Judge's action.
proper fact-finding.

Such summary conclusions do not constitute
In the recent case of Adams v. Board of

Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), the Court stated as follows:
While the purported bindings of Fact7 written by
the A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence
presented, such a rethearsal of contradictory evidence
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a
finding to truly constitute a 'finding of fact,' it must
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred....
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the
Commission accepted one version over another.
The
evidence shows several possible configurations and
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes,
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if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact
occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of
the possible subsidiary findings.
The findings are
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20.
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently informed the Industrial
Commission, further, that:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. DaIton, 598 P.2d
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P-2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
, 335 (Utah Aj \

Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 8 00 I
1990), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991

The Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review is
specifically deficient i n that i t fal ] s to make specific w
sufficient findings on the issue of medical causation

Although

none of the parties, including the Administrative Law Judge,
dispute that Petitioner

is presently permanently

and totally

disabled, neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Industrial
Commissi*

pecif ied the degree to whi ch that disabil i ty was caused

by the 1975 industrial injury.

The Industrial Commission (even

with reference to the Administrative Law Judge's insufficient
Findi ngs)

maker; rone ii;e

f inditiqs

w\

i ts

Petitioner's current medical condition and the causes for it, That
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failure manifests itself here in inadequate Findings.
The duty to make proper Findings of Fact and Conclusions ol
Law is that of the Industrial Commission, in addition to, anc
beyond that, made by the Administrative Law Judge. The Respondents
have only made a half-hearted attempt to defend the Administrative
Law Judged Findings and limit their defense of the Industrial
Commission's Findings to the single sentence "The Commission's
findings, though more brief than those of the ALJ, are clear,
consistent

and

are

supported

(Respondent's Brief at 19).

by

substantial

evidence".

That is indeed faint praise.

Findings are evaluated not as to whether they are "clear and
consistent."

Rather, "the findings must be sufficiently detailed

and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Nyrehr
v. Industrial Commission, supra at 335. The evidence here was not
"capable

of

only

one

conclusion"

and

thus

the

Industrial

Commission's inadequate findings renders its Order Denying Motion
for Review "arbitrary and capricious".
The Industrial Commission's, as well as the Administrative Lav;
Judge's, purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
should at a minimum be vacated and remanded with instructions to
enter a new Order with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshall the evidence in
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App.
16

1989) .
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that
the Industrial Commission erred when it entered ir August 3r 1992
Order dismissing Mr. Zupon's clai m for permai ler
benefits for lack of medical causation.

*. *abi ! ity

Mr. Zupon is entitled to

benefits under the "odd-lot doctrine as a matter of law.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award
hi int

permai lei it,

total

d :i sabj 1 i ty

benef i ts

based

u n c o n t r o v e r t e d facts .and m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d .
D A T E D t h i s 24th d a y of M a y , 3 9

«

~:he

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoinc
Reply Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this
24th day of May, 1993 to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
(1 original & 7 copies)
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 South 300 East
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies)

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. BOX 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies)

Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW, P.C.
One Utah Center, Suite 1000
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(2 copies)

Mr. John W. Zupon
292 Welby Street
Helper, Utah 84526

(1 copy)

pies)

File

DABtfEYl ESQ\
Attorneys for Petitioner/
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A;

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975).

EXHIBIT B:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(March 18, 1992).

EXHIBIT C;

Order Denying Motion for Review (August, 3, 1992).

35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In eases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of his average weekly wages at
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week.
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and m writing that such
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%%
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week out of t h a t special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitlied to any such benefits
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.

EXHIBIT A

Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week.
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer
or insurance carrier compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in all jftther cases, however,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disability.
Tn no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week for 312 weeks.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 91000568
*
JOHN ZUPON,
Applicant,
VS«

KAISER STEEL CORPORATION (SelfInsured) /UNINSURED EMPLOYERS
FUND and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE
FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 6, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock
a.m.
Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by Virginius Dabney
Attorney.
The defendants, Kaiser Steel Corporation (Self-Insured) and/or
Uninsured Employers Fund were not represented at the hearing.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie Boorman,
Administrator.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits
related to an August 7, 1975 industrial back accident. In a stipulation filed
with the Industrial Commission on the day of the hearing, the parties stipulated
that if permanent total disability benefits were awarded, the self-insured
employer had only a 1/6 proportionate share liability in such an award and that
this share had already been paid as between the employer and the Uninsured
Employers Fund. As a result of the stipulation, only the Employers Reinsurance
Fund had potential liability and thus the only defendant at the February 6, 1992
hearing was the Employers Reinsurance Fund.
Pursuant to the stipulation, the Employers Reinsurance Fund stipulated
to a 5/6 proportionate share of liability if permanent total disability benefits
are awarded. However, the Employers Reinsurance Fund (ERF) argued at hearing
that the applicant is not entitled to an award of permanent total disability
benefits. ERF argues that the industrial injury at issue contributed very little
to the applicant's overall disability and that the 10% whole man impairment that
a prior medical panel awarded to the applicant, as related to the August 7, 1975
industrial accident, is not well founded.
Even if there is a 10% whole man
impairment related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident, ERF argues that
that small amount, compared with the 50% whole man impairment that was found to
be related to pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis, was a minor contribution to
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the applicant's significant existing disability. ERF cites two cases which deal
with injured employees whose permanent disabilities were found to have been
caused by problems unrelated to the relatively minor compensable industrial
injury involved. Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 713 (Utah
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). ERF also
argues that it was the advancement of the arthritis to the applicant's hands and
fingers, which occurred sometime after the industrial accident and was unrelated
to the industrial accident, which caused the applicant to become truly disabled.
ERF points to the Social Security Disability records as support for this
argument.
In a letter to the Employers Reinsurance Fund, dated February 5, 1992,
the applicant's attorney summarized the basis for the applicant's claim of
permanent total disability related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident.
In referring to the causal connection between the industrial accident and the
permanent total disability, that letter indicates that the applicant relies
primarily on: 1) the failure to return to work after the August 7, 1975
industrial accident and 2) the award of Social Security Disiability beginning
January 1, 1977 with a primary diagnosis of ankylosis of the lumbar spine. The
letter states:
The Decision of the social Security Administration,
Administrative Law Judge confirms that when the lumbar problem
extended into Mr. Zupon's extremities causing him to lose hand
and finger dexterity, he then became totally disabled. . . .
Please also note that Mr. Zupon never had any problems with
his arms, hands or fingers prior to the industrial accident,
and that problems with regard to his extermitites were
subsequent to that event.
Based on the explanation above, the ALJ understands that the applicant claims
that his hand and finger problmes are somehow related to the lumbar problem.
After the hearing, the ALJ took the matter under advisement so that she
could review the medical records submitted at hearing (Exhibit A-l). The matter
was considered ready for order as soon as the records were reviewed.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 51 years old on the date of injury and
who is currently 67 years old. The applicant's compensation rate has been set
by prior Commission order at $155.00 per week (Exhibit E). At the time of the
applicant's industrial injury, on August 7, 1975, the applicant was employed by
Kaiser Coal Corporation in Sunnyside, Utah. He was working in mine #3 when he
was injured. The applicant's duties at the mine included maintenance and repair
of mechanical and electrical equipment and he was also the fireboss. On the date
of injury, the applicant was lifting an acetylene tank which he described as
being 5 feet long and 18 inches in diameter. The applicant estimated that the
tank weighed around 200 pounds. As he started to lift the tank off the ground,
the applicant's weight was not under the tank. The tank was off to the side of
him and thus he was twisting as he lifted the tank. The applicant stated that
he felt a sharp pain in his low back just below the beltline as he attempted to
lift the tank. The applicant stated that he could hardly walk after that.
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The applicant was seen the same day by Dr. S. Smoot at Carbon Medical
Services Association in Dragerton, Utah. Dr. Smoot's medical report for that day
indicates that X-rays were t,aken of the lumbar spine. The X-ray report indicates
that the film was read to show extensive degenerative changes and early spur
formation. Dr. Smoot decided to treat the applicant conservatively and he had
the applicant return approximately a week later (the date on the office note is
not legible). Per the office note for this follow-up visit, Dr. Smoot noted that
the applicant had aches and pains all over his body at that time. Dr. Smoot
noted that this was probably a generalized arthritic reaction. He prescribed
some wygesic and butazolidine. On August 27, 1975, Dr. Smoot again saw the
applicant and he noted that the applicant was feeling somewhat better, but that
his generalized discomforts continued. He continued the applicant on the same
medication. The September 3, 1975 office note indicates that the applicant was
still complaining of pain in the back and shoulders and "all over." Dr. Smoot
changed the applicant's medication and a week later he noted that the applicant
was still having some pain inthe mid-thoracic and lumbar area. On September 17,
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant's complaints remained the same and he
gave the applicant instructions for exercises. In follow-up on September 24,
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the exercises had made the applicant feel worse and
that at that time he even had pain in his ears. At the applicant's request, Dr.
Smoot provided the applicant with additional pain medication.
On October 1, 1975, Dr. Smoot saw the applicant again and he noted that
the pain was worse in the shoulder. He re-X-rayed the lumbar spine and again
noted only the degenerative changes. He indicated that the applicant would
probably need an orthopedic consultation. This was not scheduled until later in
the month and thus Dr. Smoot saw the applicant twice more. On October 7, 1975
Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant had aches in all his joints. Dr. Smoot's
office note for that date also indicates that the applicant had been talking to
his brother-in-law who worked for Social Security. As a result, the applicant
asked Dr. Smoot about being "totaled out." On that same day, the applicant filed
his initial application for Social Security Disability benefits. The applicant
saw Dr. Smoot one more time on October 15, 1975 and Dr. Smoot's note for that
date indicates only that the applicant was feeling worse and that he was to see
a Dr. E. Chapman on October 20, 1975 for an orthopedic consultation.
Dr. Chapman's October 20, 1975 office note indicates that the
applicant's treatment to that point had been limited to rest and medication. He
noted that the applicant was having continued pain in the mid and lower spine
with radiation to the hips (left greatexr than right), with neck pains and right
arm pain. Dr. Chapman read X-rays of the dorsal spine, the lumbar spine and the
pelvis to show arthritic spurring. His assessment was that the applicant was
experiencing the residuals of an acute strain of the lower lumbar spine. He
prescribed a book on back care, a Taylor back brace, a cervical pillow and he
recommended that the applicant rest frequently and put a board under his
mattress. When Dr. Chapman saw him again on October 24, 1975, he noted that the
applicant had improved and had "taken to" the Taylor brace. Dr. Chapman's office
note states that the applicant still had back pain and was quite certain that he
could not return to his regular job at Kaiser. However, Dr. Chapman noted that
the applicant was a master electrician and would be able to do other electrical
work that was compatible with his limitations. Nonetheless, he did not release
the applicant to return to work at that time.
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When Dr. Chapman saw the applicant again on November 13, 1975, he noted
that the applicant had experienced a recurrence of pain when he tried to be more
active. He noted that the applicant's side talent as an electrician would not
be helpful to him since it ,involved activities such as crawling in attics and
pulling on conduit. He precribed darvon for the applicant and indicated he did
not need to return for another 3 months, at which time he would be rated. He
again indicated that the applicant was unable to return to work at that time.
The next medical treatment noted in the medical records was an admit to
Castleview Hospital from January 8, 1976 to January 13, 1976 for a
hemorrhoidectomy. The applicant saw Dr. Chapman again on February 2, 1976 and
Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant was progressively getting worse with pain
throughout his lumbar spine and pain in the elbows and shoulders. Dr. Chapman
was of the opinion that surgery would not be helpful. He opined that the
applicant would not be able to retrun to work as a miner and he determined that
the applicant had a 50% loss of body function as a result of the industrial
injury. This apparently was some kind of a rough estimate and was not an
impairment rating, because in the same office note, Dr. Chapman indicates that
he would not assign a disability rating due to the complicated nature of the
disability. He recommended that the applicant obtain a rating from an Industrial
Commission medical panel. ^ When Dr. Chapman completed his "final bill" for the
carrier, on February 19, 1976, he indicated on it that the applicant was still
unable to return to work. He noted that the applicant had a severe residual
disability and that it was difficult to separate the possible pre-existing
problem from the industrial portion. He again noted on this billing that the
applicant should be seen by an Industrial Commission medical panel to be rated.
The applicant apparently did file an application for hearing with the
Industrial Commission sometime after his February visit with Dr. Chapman. While
the application was being processed and the matter was being set for hearing, the
applicant again returned to Dr. Chapman on June 22, 1976. On this visit, the
applicant complained of pain in the shoulders, elbows and hands.
Per Dr.
Chapman's office note, this had been present prior to the date of injury for 6
or 7 years, but had gradually become worse and quite severe within the last year.
Dr. Chapman did shoulder X-rays and found these to be negative, but elbow and
hand X-rays were read to show arthritic narrowing and spurring. After reviewing
the X-rays, Dr. Chapman listed the applicant's diagnoses as: 1) progressive
arthritis of the spine, shoulders, elbows and hands and 2) possible entrapment
of flexor tendon, middle finger, right hand. Dr. Chapman concluded that the
applicant was permanently disabled for his regular occupation in the coal mine
due to progressive generalized arthritis. This was the applicant's last visit
with Dr. Chapman.
On August 23, 1976, the applicant attended a hearing at the Industrial
Commission. The ALJ who heard that case referred the matter to a medical panel.
Thereafter, the applicant saw Dr. A. MacArthur, presumably an orthopedic
physician, on September 28, 1976. Dr. MacArthur's records are found in the
medical record exhibit under the tab for Dr. Chapman's records. Dr. Chapman is
associated with the Central Utah Orthopedic Clinic in Provo, Utah and it may be
that Dr. MacArthur is also associated with that clinic. That information is not
in the medical record exhibit. Another possibility is that Dr. MacArthur has a
separate practice and Dr. Chapman referred the applicant there for a second
opinion. At any rate, Dr. MacArthur's analysis of the applicant's condition is
quite differenct from that of Dr. Chapman.
Dr. MacArthur noted that the
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applicant's chief complaint was back pain subsequent to an acute lumbar strain
from which the applicant did not improve.
He noted that the applicant was
experiencing constant pain and stiffness, but no leg pain. Per Dr. MacArthur's
office note, the applicant's symptoms were aggravated by any activity and the
applicant felt he was getting worse. Dr. MacArthur's office note indicates that
there was no numbness or weakness, no abnormal gait or stance, no spinous process
tenderness, no sensory or motor defecits, and no spasm.
He noted that the
applicant had been under no active treatment program. He concluded that he did
not believe that the applicant had back pain significant enough to keep him from
working. He recommended return to work unless something could be detected by way
of radiological studies. When Dr. MacArthur reviewed films on October 5, 1976,
he noted that the X-rays showed only very minimal arthritic changes and nothing
he could put together with the applicant's history and physical which would cause
the applicant to be unable to return to work or to be restricted in his work.
On November 24, 1976, the Industrial Commission medical panel issued its
report (Tab D, Exhibit A - l ) . The medical panel read the applicant's X-rays to
show sacroiliac sclerosis and arthritic changes along the entire lumbar spine
consistent with the clinical impression of ankylosing spondylitis. The panel
concluded that the applicant was physically capable of doing light work but was
unable to do mining or mechanical work. The panel rated the applicant as having
a 60% whole person permanent impairment (without taking into consideration his
loss of eyesight in the left eye) and the panel attributed 10% of that impairment
to the industrial injury because there was "a one-in-six chance that the
ankylosing spondylitis was aggravated by the lumbar back strain on the basis of
the progression of the X-ray changes, and this man's inability to return to
work."
The panel concluded that there was no need for future medical care
related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident. On February 10, 1977, the
prior ALJ in this matter issued a on order awarding the applicant permanent
impairment benefits based on the 10% whole person impairment rated by the panel
as being related to the industrial accident.
While the matter was under adjudication at the Industrial Commission,
the applicant was going through the process of applying for Social Security
Disability benefits (see Tab L, Exhibit A-l generally). The applicant's initial
application was denied and the applicant applied for a hearing that was held on
June 15, 1976. After the hearing, the applicant was again denied in a decision
issued on November 19, 1976. This decision was affirmed on appeal to the Appeals
Council on January 18, 1977, but the matter was reopened in late 1977 as will be
noted to follow.
In April of 1977, the applicant was apparently rerated by the VA with
respect to his impairment or disability. There is a medical record indicating
that the rating was apportioned as follows: 40% anklosing spondylitis, 30% left
eye, and 10% right elbow, for a combined rating of 60%. The ALJ is not real sure
how these military ratings are determined, but understands that the rating system
is not consistent with the system specified in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment.
In December of 1977, the applicant filed unspecified "new evidence" with
Social Security that resulted in the U.S. District Court remanding the matter to
Social Security for consideration of the new evidence. A supplemental hearing
was conducted on May 31, 1978 and the decision to award benefits was issued on
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July 11, 1978, That decision (found under Tab L, Exhibit A-l, pp. 157-161) notes
that the applicant's arthritis in his hands became much worse starting in January
of 1977. In contrast, the applicant actually noted some improvement in his back
pain as a result of losing 30 pounds between January and May 1978 (Exhibit A-l,
p. 158). The decision goes on to note that the industrial injury most likely had
only a minimal effect on the applicant's disability and notes that the applicant
was net considered disabled until the arthritis in the hands and fingers became
acute in January 1977. The decision states:
Assuming that the medical panel was correct, his percentage of
disability was increased only 10% by the industrial accident.
It does not appear the additional impairment resulting from
the back strain would be sufficient to preclude claimant from
all substantial work. However, the claimant maintains that in
.. . The
addition he has lost hand and finger dexterity.
administrative law judge is impressed with the sincerity of
the claimant when he testified that beginning in January 1977
he lost the dexterity of in his hands. Until that time the
claimant is not deemed to have been disabled but considering
the credibility of the claimant's testimony as to the effect
of arthritis in his hands and fingers together with his other
impairments, it is found that he claimant became disabled
January 1, 1977 which disability has been continuing.
(Exhibit A-l, pp. 160-161). The Social Security ALJ noted that prior to the
problems with the hands, the vocational expert indicated that the applicant was
capable of performing light electrical work.
There are no medical records in the medical record exhibit (Exhibit A-l)
indicating any actual treatment for back pain or lumbar problems after 1976. In
December of 1981, the applicant was reevaluated by Dr. C. Bench, apparently to
determine whether Social Security Disability benefits would continue at that
point. Dr. Bench's report is located at Tab L, Exhibit A-l(pp. 164-165). After
examination his impression was: 1) history of low back pain and low back injury,
rule out ankylosing spondylitis, 2) rule out rheumatoid arthritis, 3) cervical
spondylosis with headaches, 4) traumatic injury left eye, rendered blind, 5)
chronic sinusitis and 6) obesity. In an addendum report, Dr. Bench noted that
the rheumatoid factor tests were negative and he revised his impressions as
follows: 1) early cervical spondylosis with early degenerative disk disease of
C5-6, 2) low back pain secondary to degenerative disk disease L5-S1 moderate in
severity, 3) pain in the right shoulder secondary to some right sub-acromial
bursitis and degenerative arthritis of the right AC joint, to a minimal degree.
His comment was: "I think this patient's symptoms are way out of proportion to
the objective findings which are presented."
From February 10, 1983 through May 25, 1983, the applicant was an
inpatient in Castleview Hospital and the University of Utah Hospital with
extensive intestinal problems and several surgeries.
The applicant had
postoperative septicemia and renal failure with gastrointestinal bleeding and it
was necessary for him to be monitored in the intensive care unit for several
weeks.
It is unclear what if any impairment resulted due to this extended
intensive treatment and surgery.
In May and June of 1988, the applicant
apparently underwent cardiac evaluation as noted by the Holter Monitor tests done
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at the Salt Lake Clinic. Those records are somewhat unclear with respect to what
conclusions were made as a result of the tests.
With respect to pre-existing conditions, the applicant sustained a
perforating wound to his left cornea while working in a mine in October of 1954.
There are a couple medical records from this incident under Tab H in the medical
record exhibit. The applicant testified at hearing that he was hit in the left
wrist, by a pitched ball when playing baseball in 1941, but there are no medial
records from this incident and the applicant indicated that he had had no
problems with the wrist subsequent to 1941. He stated that he had no breathing
problems resulting from his years of work in the mines.
The applicant completed the 11th grade in highschool. The applicant's
work history includes working for the railroad for 2 years, some electrical work
and training in the service for 4 years and thereafter in underground mines (from
1946 through 1975). The applicant indicated that while he was employed working
in the mines he also did some electrical contracting and furnace installation on
the side. The applicant stated that after his back injury in 1975, he tried to
get work as a fireboss again but was denied jobs because he could not pass the
physical. His wife testified that the applicant did try to find work, but the
X-rays of his back always prevented him from passing the physicals.
The applicant was paid 25 weeks of temporary total compensation by the
employer from August of 1976 to February of 1976. In February of 1976, he began
receiving union disability pension benefits (amount unspecified) and he
apparently continues to receive this along with his social security benefits
(amount also unspecified). In February of 1977, he began receiving non-service
connected VA disability benefits ($200.00 per month).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ finds that the applicant has failed to sustain his burden of
proof in establishing a medical causal connection between his permanent inability
to work and the August 7, 1975 industrial injury. The ALJ finds that there are
two main reasons why the evidence does not support the requisite causal
connection. First, the evidence shows that it was the arthritic condition in the
hands and fingers that truly caused the applicant to be unable to work, not the
ankylosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine. Second, even if one were to presume
that the ankylosing spondylitis was causing the applicant to be disabled, the
industrial injury did not cause the ankylosing spondylitis and only questionably
aggravated it.
A.

The Cause of the Inability to Work:

The July 11, 1978 Social Security Disability (SSD) decision makes it
very clear that Social Security found that the applicant became unable to perform
gainful employment when the arthritis in his hands and fingers became severe in
January 1977, and not before that. The applicant was denied Social Security
Disability benefits in a series of decisions prior to when SSD gave consideration
to the onset of arthritis in the extremities. Therefore, Social Security found
that the applicant's lumbar problems, even with the aggravation that may have
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been caused by the industrial back injury, was not a sufficient disabling
condition to cause him to be unable to perform any gainful work. The vocational
expert who testified at the May 1978 SSD hearing indicated that there were jobs
in the region where the applicant lived that he could have performed in 1978
(after the industrial injury) if he had not lost the dexterity in his hands and
fingers. The July 11, 1978 Social Security decision re-emphasizes this in very
plain terms. Although this ALJ is not bound in any way by the findings of the
Social Security Administration, this ALJ finds the SSD decision very relevant and
convincing. It is convincing because other evidence presented to this ALJ, to
be discussed below, is consistent with the SSD determination that it was the
arthritis in the hands that caused the applicant to be totally disabled, and not
the anklosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine, which caused the applicant to be
only partially disabled (unable to perform the demanding work in the mines and
as a building construction electrician).
The applicant has argued that the arthritis in the hands and fingers is
somehow related or was somehow caused by the lumbar condition. The February 5,
1992 letter to the Administrator of the Employers Reinsurance Fund, noted at the
beginning of this Order, refers to when the "lumbar problem extended into Mr.
Zupon's extremities." Unfortunately, there is no medical evidence at all which
even suggests that the lumbar condition and the condition in the hands and
fingers is somehow related.
The applicant has pointed out that he had no
problems in his hands until after the industrial accident, but there needs to be
more than just a sequential finding to say that the lumbar back strain on August
7, 1975 caused the progressive degenerative arthritis in the hands and fingers.
In addition, the applicant's argument is this regard is not clearly supported by
the medical records. Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant had been having
problems with his hands and fingers for 6 or 7 years prior to the date of injury
and that it became more severe in 1977. It is the applicant's burden to present
supportive medical evidence for his theories on the medical causal connection
between the work injury and the disabling condition.
In arguing that the
arthritis in the extremities is related to the back strain, the ALJ finds that
the applicant has failed to sustain this burden.
B.

The Contribution of the Industrial Injury?

Although the ALJ finds that the analysis under A. above is sufficient
to sustain a finding that permanent total disability benefits are not payable,
the ALJ feels it is appropriate to also discuss the limited role the industrial
injury played in the applicant's overall disability.
The applicant has
emphasized that he did not return to work after the industrial injury and has
pointed out that a prior medical panel found that the industrial injury
permanently aggravated his pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis. However, the
medical evidence presented for this adjudication leaves the ALJ with some
question regarding why the applicant did not return to work after the industrial
injury and leaves the ALJ with some real questions regarding the prior medical
panel's finding that the applicant sustained a 10% whole person impairment as a
result of the industrial injury.
After the industrial back strain on August 7, 1975, the applicant
received only conservative care for his back for several months. No acute injury
to the spine was ever diagnosed radiologically. Surgery was never recommended
or performed. There are no medical records regarding treatment for the back from
1976 forward. The 1976 medical panel concluded that the applicant would need no
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future treatment for the back related to the industrial injury. The office notes
of the doctors that treated the applicant just after the industrial^injury (Dr.
Smoot and Dr. Chapman) include regular mention of pain or limited use in many
areas of the body besides the lumbar spine. The shoulders, the mid-thoracic
spine, the hips, the neck and the elbows are all mentioned. Dr. Smoot noted
aches in "all joints" at one point and even mentions ear pain.
The medical
evidence seems to suggest that the applicant was experiencing symptoms related
to what Dr. Chapman diagnosed as "progressive arthritis of the spine, shoulders,
elbows and hands."
Dr. MacArthur concluded in September 1976 that the
applicant's back pain was not so severe* as to prevent him from working and Dr.
MacArthur went so far as to state that the applicant needed no work restrictions.
As late as 1981, when the applicant was re-evaluated for SSD by Dr. Bench, the
medical conclusion was that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded any
objective findings.
In spite of the above findings, this ALJ would probably have done what
the previous Industrial Commission ALJ did and would have given the applicant the
benefit of the doubt by awarding the 10% whole person impairment that the medical
panel attributed to the industrial injury. However, this would have been giving
the applicant the extreme benefit of the doubt.
This ALJ has never seen a
medical panel finding of impairment that is based on a 1 in 6 chance that there
might have been an aggravation. The ALJ recognizes that there is some doubt in
any medical conclusion, but the ALJ has always been of the impression that there
should be a greater than 50% chance before the medical experts can say something
probably caused something else. If it is less than 50%, or a lot less as in this
case, then the ALJ would think that the panel would have to say it is NOT more
likely than not that the connection exists.
Notwithstanding the highly questionable analysis of the prior panel,
even if one concedes that the industrial injury caused 10% whole person
impairment, this is still a very minimal portion of the applicant's overall
disability or impairment. If not for the causation problems discussed above, the
ALJ might find that the 1/6 contribution was sufficient to support a finding that
the industrial injury caused the total disability. However, considering all the
other evidence, the ALJ must conclude that there is insufficient supportive
evidence to find that the industrial injury caused the applicant's total
disability.
As such, the applicant's claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial injury must be dismissed.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident is
dismissed for failure to establish a medical causal connection between the
industrial accident and the applicant's total disability.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall
be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.
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The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of respondent in the above captioned matter, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant filed a claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to in industrial injury on August 7, 1975. A
hearing was held on February 6, 1992. In her decision of March 18,
1992, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the applicants
claim. The applicant timely filed this motion for review and was
granted additional time to submit a memorandum in support of his
motion. The applicant submitted a memorandum two months after the
time had expired for submission of his memorandum.
1. DID THE ALJ APPLY THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF?
The applicant asserts that he was prejudiced by the ALJ's use
of a "higher standard of proof than is found in the law." It is
unclear what "higher standard" the applicant believes was used
here, but examination of the record indicates that the ALJ
correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the
issue of medical causation. See Allen v.Industrial Commission,
729 P.2d 15, 23 (Utah 1986). The ALJ found that the applicant
failed to establish medical causation by a preponderance of the

evidence and denied

the

applicant's

claim

for

permanent

total

disability.
The ALJ relied on Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954
(Ct. App. 1988) which held that a showing of medical causation was
required under Allen.
U.C.A. 35-1-69 was construed to require a
showing of medical and legal causation to support an award for
permanent total compensation. Id.

EXHIBIT C

John Zupon
Order
Page two
2. DID THE ALX IMPROPERLY ANALYZE THE CLAIM AS ONE
BASED ON LUMBAR PROBLEMS IN CONJUNCTION WITH
ARTHRITIC DISABILITY IN THE HANDS AND FINGERS?
Utah Code Annotated 35-1-69 provided that:
If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital
causes, sustains an industrial injury for which
compensation and medical care is provided by this title
that results
in permanent
incapacity
which
is
substantially greater than he would have incurred if he
had not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation
and medical care . . . shall be awarded."
U.C.A. 35-1-69 (Supp. 1974). The statute contemplates that the
compensation and medical care for the preexisting impairment will
be paid out of the Second Injury Fund.
Chavez, v. Industrial
Commission, 709 P,2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1985); See Intermounta in
Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega. 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977).
U.C.A. 35-1-69 must be read in light of the other provisions
of the statute. In Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P. 2d 954
(Ct. App. 1988) the Utah Court of Appeals agreed with an ALJ of the
Industrial Commission who found that the language of 35-1-67
implies that there must be a causal connection between the
industrial injury and the permanent total disability. Jd. at 956.
The Court of Appeals held that proof of a causal connection is
required under Allen v. Industrial Commission Id. Therefore, the
applicant "for permanent total disability benefits must prove
medically that his disability was caused by an industrial
accident."
Id.
It is important to note that Large construes
language in the statute that predates the 1988 amendment.
Therefore, it appears that Large is controlling in this case and
the applicant must show a causal connection between his industrial
accident and his permanent total disability in order to receive
benefits.
The applicant asserts that Marshall v. Industrial Commission,
704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) requires the Commission to apply the law
as it existed at the time of the applicants injury. Marshall
stands for the proposition that benefits to be awarded in workers'
compensation cases are to be determined based on the statute as it
existed at the time of injury. Although the applicant was injured
in August 1975, he did not file his application for a hearing on
permanent total disability until May 24, 1991.
The relevant
language in 35-1-67 was amended to require a showing of a causal
connection in 1988. Thus, all case law construing the statute
prior to 1988 should apply in the interpretation of the statute.
Under Large, the applicant is required to show a causal connection
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between his industrial accident and his permanent disability. The
applicant failed to show the requisite causal connection and,
therefore, his request for permanent total disability was properly
denied by the ALJ.
3. DID THE ALJ IMPROPERLY FIND THAT THE INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF
THE APPLICANT'S DISABILITY?
The applicant attempted to show that the August 7, 1975
industrial accident was the medical cause of his permanent total
disability by showing that he never returned to work after the
accident and that he was awarded social security disability
benefits beginning on January 1, 1977.
The social security decision to award benefits noted that the
arthritis in the applicant's hands became much worse beginning in
January 1977 and observed that the applicant's industrial injury
most likely had minimal effect on the applicant's disability. The
Social Security Administration (SSA) did not consider the applicant
to be disabled until the arthritis in his hands and fingers became
acute in 1977. Prior to that time, the vocational expert who
testified at the SSA hearing indicated that there were jobs that
the applicant could perform in 1978 had he not lost dexterity in
his hands and fingers. Although the SSA hearing is not binding on
the commission under the statute in effect at the time of the
applicant's injury, it is relevant to determining the extent of the
applicant's disability as well as its causal connection to the
applicant's industrial injury.
Examination of the applicant's medical records shows that he
received no treatment for back pain or lumbar pain after 1976.
Office notes of the doctors who treated the applicant immediately
following the industrial accident regularly mention pain or limited
use in many areas of the body, suggesting that the applicant was
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis of the spine,
shoulders,elbows and hands. Upon examination of the applicant in
1976, Dr. MacArthur*concluded that the applicant's back pain was
not so severe as to prevent him from working. In 1981, when the
applicant was re-evaluated for SSA by Dr. Bench, the doctor
concluded that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded his
objective findings. Thus, the medical records do not establish a
medical causal connection between the applicant's August 7, 1975
industrial injury and his permanent total disability.
4. SHOULD THE ALJ HAVE AWARDED THE APPLICANT A
FIFTY PERCENT WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT FOR THE
PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT IDENTIFIED BY THE
1976 MEDICAL PANEL?
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Review of the applicant's Application for Hearing and the
record, indicates that the applicant never requested consideration
of a claim for permanent partial disability• Under 35-1-66 (Supp.
1974), a claim for permanent partial disability benefits must be
filed within 8 years of the date of injury. In the present case,
the applicant filed his'application for hearing sixteen years after
the injury. Therefore, the time for filing an application for
permanent partial disability benefits had run when the applicant
filed his application for permanent total disability benefits on
May 24, 1991.
5. DID THE ALJ FAIL TO DELINEATE ADEQUATE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW?
The applicant asserts that the Order fails to delineate
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the
ALJ's Order in light of Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18 (1991) , indicates that the ALJ made findings sufficient to
"disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached."
Milne Truck
Lines, Inc. v.- Public^ Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979) cited in Adams, at 20. The ALJ's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are sufficient to show what issues were decided,
legal interpretations and applications made, as well as the
subsidiary factual findings which support her decision. See Adams
at 21.
Therefore, the commission finds that the ALJ's Order
contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to
support her decision to deny benefits to the applicant.
6. WAS THE ALJ'S DECISION ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS?
Review of the record indicates that there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's findings. The applicant failed to
delineate his specific objections in sufficient enough detail to
allow the commission to address them.
However, review of the
entire record indicates that the ALJ's findings are not arbitrary
and capricious.
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated March 18, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.
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